Ahab And Becoming-Whale: The Nomadic Subject In Smooth Space by Lorraine, Tamsin E.
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy 
2005 
Ahab And Becoming-Whale: The Nomadic Subject In Smooth 
Space 
Tamsin E. Lorraine 
Swarthmore College, tlorrai1@swarthmore.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Tamsin E. Lorraine. (2005). "Ahab And Becoming-Whale: The Nomadic Subject In Smooth Space". Deleuze 
And Space. 159-175. 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/102 
This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty 
Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu. 
Edinburgh University Press
 
 
Chapter Title: Ahab and Becoming-Whale: The Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space
Chapter Author(s): Tamsin Lorraine
 
Book Title: Deleuze and Space
Book Editor(s): Ian Buchanan, Gregg Lambert
Published by: Edinburgh University Press. (2005)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1r2c49.13
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Edinburgh University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Deleuze and Space
This content downloaded from 130.58.106.203 on Tue, 21 Jan 2020 16:53:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Ahab and Becoming-Whale: The
Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space
Tamsin Lorraine
The work of Gilles Deleuze develops a way of conceiving reality in terms
of dynamic process that privileges difference rather than identity, move-
ment rather than stasis, and change rather than what remains the same.
This way of thinking challenges not only traditional ontologies focussed
on the underlying essences of shifting appearances, but theories of space
and time related to those ontologies. On Deleuze’s view, common sense
notions of space and time as totalised wholes within which everything
can be either spatially or chronologically related with respect to every-
thing else are no more than retrospective constructs. The movements of
life are related to one another in heterogeneous blocks of space-time that
defy such representation. Of course we can and do locate ourselves with
respect to spatial constructs (grids of miles or metres, for example) or
time-lines that we can coordinate with the spatial and temporal con-
structs of others. But on Deleuze’s view, conscious experience, informed
as it is by the spatial and temporal orientation of individuals as well as
the coordination of individual experiences into a collective experience of
a socially shared space and time, are the emergent effect of mostly imper-
ceptible processes.
The normative subject of contemporary culture orients herself with
respect to conventional notions of space and time. The ‘nomadic’ subject
that appears in the work of Deleuze, and Deleuze’s work with Félix
Guattari, experiences and thinks space and time in terms of blocks of space-
time that are not necessarily linked into a rational whole of measurable
units. The transformation of the paranoid subject of contemporary culture
into a schizo subject able to evolve creatively in interdependent commun-
ion with others requires not only relinquishing normative conceptions of
self; it also requires rethinking the space-time coordinates of the conven-
tional reality through which normative subjects orient themselves.
I explore the alternative conception of space that emerges in the
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concepts of heterogeneous blocks of space-time and smooth space devel-
oped by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (1987). Like
Deleuze’s concepts of the time-image in Cinema 2 (1989) or the non-
pulsed time of Aion in The Logic of Sense (1990), the concepts of blocks
of space-time and smooth space challenge the reader not only to think
but experience reality differently. In particular, they foster sensitivity to
the spaces that might disrupt processes of what Deleuze and Guattari call
‘territorialisation’ that homogenise heterogeneous blocks of space-time
into the regulated units of social space, thus opening up new possibilities
in living. The nomadic subject open to unconventional spatial orienta-
tions can make new connections in keeping with the movement of life as
it unfolds. I will consider the case of Ahab – the sea captain obsessed with
chasing the great white whale, Moby-Dick – in order to explore the
opportunities as well as the risks such experiments in living can entail.
Territories and the Refrain
Deleuze conceives of a body (be it physical or conceptual) as a set of
habitually patterned forces that sustains itself through its powers to
affect and be affected by the forces surrounding it. The non-personal
powers to affect and be affected of the myriad processes of a human
subject sustain patterns of the past in keeping with the conditions of the
present. Conscious awareness – including the spatial orientation that
inflects it – is the emergent effect of processes that are imperceptible as
well as perceptible. Physical and symbolic processes comprise events or
singularities – points at which critical thresholds are reached that result
in a set of elements moving from one kind of state into another. Each
state in the series of states that comprises the subject is a convergence of
habitual patterns of these processes, relations of movement and rest, and
capacities to affect and be affected that are either actual or potential.
These states of relative equilibrium are always on the verge of shifting in
keeping with shifting conditions that bring the elements of its patterns to
thresholds that constitute shifts in patterns. These processes take place at
levels below as well as above the threshold of awareness.
Painting, like other art forms, can alert us to the fragility of our spatial
orientations. Artists can create monuments that evoke imperceptible
forces that affect the body at a level typically below the threshold of nor-
mative consciousness. Thus, the brush-strokes of painters like Van Gogh
and Francis Bacon bring our attention to micro-perceptions of the flesh
that defy conventional notions of objects and their boundaries, includ-
ing our own bodies as physical things occupying definite positions in
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space. In What is Philosophy? (1994) Deleuze and Guattari suggest that
such painters depict the body as flesh that is opened onto a surrounding
space – the ‘house’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 179–81). This space or
territory is a space of intimate exchange of the body with its immediate
surroundings that allows the self-regulation of the organism that sustains
its continued existence. This territory, in turn, opens onto the ‘cosmos-
universe’ or the universe as whole. Opening the flesh to the cosmos-uni-
verse without the protective space of a house or personal territory would
lead to the demise of the individual. Refusing any connection to the
cosmos-universe except those permitted by one’s territory can lead to
deadening repetition. Art can ‘think’ our relationship to the universe in
a way that can open us up to a reality beneath the threshold of conven-
tional experience without completely destroying our spatial orientation
in the process.
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari characterise territorial
animals as natural artists who establish relations to imperceptible as well
as perceptible forces through the refrains of song (birds) or movements
and markings (wolves, rabbits) that create a kind of space of life-sustain-
ing regularities within the chaotic space of the cosmos. Living organisms
have interior milieus (cellular formation, organic functions) and exterior
milieus (food to eat, water to drink, ground to walk on). ‘Every milieu is
vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time constituted by the peri-
odic repetition of the component’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 313). All
the milieus of the organism have their own patterns and these patterns
interact with the patterns of the other milieus with which they commu-
nicate. The rhythm of the interactions between these different milieus
‘does not operate in a homogeneous space-time, but by heterogeneous
blocks’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311). The periodic repetitions of the
different milieus cannot be correlated according to the metre of regular
time. Rhythm ‘is the Unequal or the Incommensurable’ of the differences
among the periodic repetitions of distinct milieus. Thus, an organism
emerges from chaos (‘the milieu of all milieus’) as vibratory milieus or
blocks of space-time that create rhythms within the organism as well as
with the milieus exterior to the organism. The refrain allows the territo-
rialisation of milieus and rhythms that creates a home; the various
rhythms of the body’s components and their relations to interior and
exterior blocks of space-time become homogenised into the lived experi-
ence of the organism. The organism as a self-regulating whole with its
own spatial orientation can then be opened up to forces beyond it.
Deleuze and Guattari describe the initial emergence of a child’s terri-
tories in A Thousand Plateaus:
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A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his
breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients
himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of
a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos.
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311)
It takes a while for a child to develop the sense of space through which
she is able definitively to pinpoint different locations. Various kinds of
refrains – of song, habitual activities, favourite words or phrases – help
her to create a space that allows her to feel more at home. The spaces of
sand and sun and water, grass and sky and trees, quilt and crib and room,
are distinguishable not through the different locations they occupy (the
Jersey shore located a two-hour drive from the backyard of a house that
has her bedroom on the second floor), but through the different feelings
and sensations associated with the routines that emerge in playing at the
beach, walking in the backyard, and lying in bed. It takes the daily rep-
etition of habitual activities (down the stairs to breakfast, up the stairs
to bed) and repeated trips (‘are we there yet?’) before the different spaces
of various activities can begin to be connected into one continuous and
stable space. A rupture in the child’s routine, a ‘mistake in speed, rhythm,
or harmony would be catastrophic because it would bring back the
forces of chaos, destroying both creator and creation’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987: 311). The spaces of childhood not yet connected to the
homogenised, regulated space of conventional reality is a fragile one. The
patterns of bodily needs and satisfactions created in early infancy unfold
into the rhythms of routines and habits that help the child to organise her
surrounding environment into the enduring contours of home.
Individuals of all sorts need to sustain their power to affect and be
affected. This requires maintaining patterns of self-regulation. But in
addition to creating a space that allows one to sustain the comforting
rhythms of familiar places, one must also be able to confront the new:
‘one opens the circle a crack . . . One launches forth, hazards an improv-
isation. But to improvise is to join with the World, or meld with it. One
ventures from home on the thread of a tune’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:
311). Maintaining one’s home-space requires repeating refrains that have
become familiar, but to withstand the novel rhythms of life that always
encroach, one must be able to improvise new refrains that bear some
relationship to old rhythms. The normative subject of contemporary
society tends to sustain itself through a form of self that staves off forms
of repetition that entail continual becoming-other. In addition to the
binary machines of personal and social identity (woman/man, daugh-
ter/son, black/white, Protestant/Jew), this means orienting one’s experi-
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ence of space and time in keeping with a socially sanctioned totalised
whole of measurable units. Beneath the threshold of a reality represented
through such coordinates are the heterogeneous space-times of the inter-
ior milieus of organic processes as well as the interactions of the milieus
of the individual (symbolic as well as organic) with the myriad milieus
with which it comes into contact. Deleuze and Guattari advocate the con-
struction of nomadic ‘lines of flight’ in order to experiment with implicit
connections currently imperceptible to the subject that could be actual-
ised into new realities.
The nomadic subject able to supercede personal identity in keeping
with virtual relations that defy conventional conceptions of space will
perceive as well as think differently. Deleuze’s notion of the virtual entails
an unrepresentable reality conditioning what happens. A particular state
of affairs occurs when bodies affect other bodies in specific ways. But
bodies comprise more than what they actually do; they also comprise the
potential to act differently given different circumstances. The virtual real
is a transcendental field of virtual relations that exceed the constraints
presented by actualised subjects and their objects.1 If specific virtual rela-
tions actualise they result in states of affairs that exclude other states of
affairs, but the excluded virtual relations still insist in what actualises
with an implicit force that could yet unfold with a shift in circumstances.
Both art and philosophy can foster nomadic subjectivity. Art creates ‘per-
cepts’ to shake us out of our habitual responses to the world and open
up other possibilities in perceiving and thinking by actualising virtual
relations, thus rendering imperceptible forces perceptible. Philosophy or
‘genuine thinking’ (much of what passes for philosophical thought is,
according to Deleuze, State thinking), actualises virtual relations of sense
through the creation of concepts.2 Deleuze and Guattari have created
various concepts (for example, schizoanalysis, deterritorialisation, and
constructing a body without organs) entailing the opening of individual
self-sustaining patterns to dynamic flows of process that mutate those
patterns into a becoming-other. But if such lines of flight are to lead to
the proliferation of enlivening connections with the world rather than the
demise of the individual (never mind the destruction of those around
her), such construction must be done with care. It is never a matter of
simply opening oneself to all the forces of the universe, but always of
creatively evolving one’s powers to affect and be affected by life in
concert with surrounding forces.
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The Smooth Space of Whale Hunting
Deleuze considers the implicit or virtual force of a process to be as impor-
tant as its actual functioning. The singularities of a process have virtual
relations with the singularities of other processes; when a process reaches
a critical threshold that pushes it into another pattern of activity, thus
actualising singularities that were previously only implicit, its power to
affect and be affected changes as well. Herman Melville describes such a
moment in his novel, Moby-Dick. When Ahab lies sick after losing his
leg to the great white whale, he is forced into a period of inactivity. A
critical threshold is reached, an ‘interfusing’ of body and soul that actu-
alises a capacity in Ahab for becoming-whale.3 From that point onward,
he no longer merely hunts whales; he becomes obsessed with second-
guessing the movements of one whale in order to enact his revenge. The
virtual force of the other patterns processes could form is a dynamic
aspect of present reality. Virtual powers of affecting and being affected
are aspects of the past that constitute implicit forces of the present. These
forces unfold in blocks of space-time that are only correlated to the
space-times of others through territorialisation of mutant patterns into a
regulated whole. If Ahab had territorialised the loss of his leg to that of
a sea captain carrying out a job with certain risks, he would have pursued
patterns of living – patterns of feeling, meaning, and action – that
repeated refrains others could recognise. Instead, something – some con-
figuration of forces at the physical and symbolic levels – pushes him to
unfold the imperceptible force of implicit singularities into a course of
action with a logic of its own.
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari say that, ‘[s]mooth
space is filled by events or haecceities far more than by formed and per-
ceived things. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties (Deleuze
and Guattari 1987: 478–9). Smooth space is a space of multiplicities con-
structed through local operations involving changes of direction that
may shift in keeping with the journey itself or the shifting nature of the
journey’s goal. Events of sense, haecceities, and affects are singularities
of sense, movements, and sensation-emotion that retain their relations to
the virtual real.4 Human individuals as sentient language speakers with
bodies that interact with other bodies are nodes of all three. An individ-
ual human being actualises specific configurations of meaning (Ahab is a
sea captain, not an accountant), movement (Ahab on board a ship
leaving Nantucket), and sensation-emotion (Ahab stands on deck deter-
mined to wreak revenge upon Moby-Dick). Events of sense, haecceities,
and affects comprise virtual as well as actual relations of sense, move-
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ments, and sensations-emotions; they thus resonate with the virtual real
where no power to affect or be affected has been excluded due to the spe-
cific forms an individual’s life has taken.
What Deleuze in Cinema 1 (1986) calls ‘any-space-whatever’ is a
spatial haecceity freed from conventional location within a totality to
which all spaces can be related. In the chaotic realm of the virtual, all
movements are related to other movements. In a discussion of the
concept of the movement-image inspired by Henri Bergson, Deleuze dis-
tinguishes movement from space: ‘space covered is past, movement is
present, the act of covering’ (Deleuze 1986: 1). Spaces covered by move-
ment are divisible and belong to a single, homogeneous space while
movement ‘cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time
it is divided’ (Deleuze 1986: 1). Movements of what Deleuze and
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus call ‘deterritorialisation’, unfold with
respect to one another rather than occurring within space as a void. They
are acts of uncovering that are not referred to space conceived as a
uniform area of measurable units within which changes occur.5
Organic life – including human life – requires sustained patterns where
spatial relations are repeated. A haecceity is a specific configuration of
relations that is individuated not through an absolute location in a space-
time experienced or thought as a totalised whole, but rather through the
relations themselves. When a film presents rain in a way that directs our
attention to, ‘not what rain really is, but the way in which it appears
when, silent and continuous, it drips from leaf to leaf’, it presents neither
the concept of rain or the state of a rainy time and place.6 Instead the rain
‘is a set of singularities which presents the rain as it is in itself, pure power
or quality which combines without abstraction all possible rains and
makes up the corresponding any-space-whatever’ (Deleuze 1986: 111).
Cinema can ‘think’ things as they are in themselves by presenting them in
relation to a virtual real rather than familiar activities (the camera zooms
in, allowing our attention to linger upon the raindrops glistening on a
leaf). We can then experience rain beyond the conventional refrains we
attach to our personal selves. The haecceity of a rain event is not tied to
a conventionally demarcated space located in a homogenised whole.
Instead, it forms a link to other spaces that evoke a similar set of relations
– a repetition of the configuration of molecules of water and air with their
potential as well as actual capacities to affect and be affected (the rain-
drops glistening on the leaf evoke not how many miles I will have to walk
to get home, but an infinitely variable configuration of leaf and rain that
comprise the events of ‘being rain’, ‘glistening’, and ‘being a leaf’ in shift-
ing context with other bodies that can affect or be affected by them).
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A human individual can orient herself on a trip up a coastline in terms
of the longitude and latitudes mapped out through social convention or
through following the contours of rock and beach she discovers as she
goes. In the former case, her local movements are charted with respect to
already specified points (thus imposing a plane of organisation upon the
movements that unfold). In the latter case, her space shifts at each
moment as the multiplicities of which she is a part shift (rocks-sea-ship to
sandy-beach-curved-in-sea-ship). Deleuze and Guattari advocate think-
ing of life in terms of multiplicities: ‘Multiplicities are defined by the
outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialisation
according to which they change in nature and connect with other multi-
plicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 9). A shift in multiplicities does not occur in
space; rather it establishes a different configuration of the relations of pro-
cesses in movement: slowly-evolving-rocks-choppy-sea-gliding-ship to
relatively-faster-moving-sand-calmer-waters-ship-almost-at-a-standstill:
Pure relations of speed and slowness between particles imply movements of
deterritorialisation, just as pure affects imply an enterprise of desubjectifi-
cation . . . The plane of organisation is constantly working away at the plane
of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the
movements of deterritorialisation, weigh them down, restratify them,
reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth. Conversely, the
plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organ-
isation, causing particles to spin off the strata, scrambling forms by dint of
speed or slowness, breaking down functions by means of assemblages or
microassemblages. But once again, so much caution is needed to prevent the
plane of consistency from becoming a pure plane of abolition or death, to
prevent the involution from turning into a regression to the undifferen-
tiated. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 269–70)
A subject who orients herself with respect to movements rather than a
retrospectively created construct of space actualises configurations of
singularities that never settle into any one pattern. She experiences space
not in terms of a totality to which it is connected (I walk across the lawn
near the park and the highway), but rather pure relations of speed and
slowness (grass under moving feet as wind lifts hair) that evoke powers
to affect and be affected, both actual and potential (feet pushing against
ground, could push off the ground or run). Pure affects are intensities –
capacities to affect and be affected – not yet subjected to the homogen-
ising dictates of conscious awareness.7 Once an affect is experienced as
a feeling or thought, it has already undergone a process of selection
where some of its capacities have been emphasised at the expense of
166 Deleuze and Space
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others. The nomadic subject is able to experience space in terms of haec-
ceities and thus lengthen the gap between perception and action in order
to resonate with imperceptible forces of affect. This can, in turn, lead to
a creative response uniquely suited to the actual and virtual relations of
the present situation rather than a repetition of habitual patterns of
action developed in the past.
The whale hunting of the nineteenth century Herman Melville
describes in Moby-Dick constitutes a multiplicity of men, ships and sea,
that for the most part operates in smooth space. Unlike ships or planes
with specific destinations and set schedules, the whaling ships of
Nantucket deliberately cruise some of the most isolated waters of the
globe in pursuit of the whale oil through which the ships’ owners can
make a profit. Although the captains of whaling ships make use of a
quadrant by which they can ascertain their position according to fixed
points of latitude and longitude, for the most part, life on a ship plays
out in the unmarked space of the open sea. Although the set goal of a
whale hunting venture is obtaining whale oil, the hunting of whales must
unfold in keeping with the movement of the whales themselves. The ships
go to the waters most likely to be frequented by whales, set their itiner-
aries in keeping with whale sightings, and pursue the whales with which
they actually cross paths. Waves play across the sea’s surface or die down
in rhythm with changing winds and currents. Whales travel great dis-
tances in their ceaseless search for food. Work on the ship is reoriented
from day to day in keeping with shifting configurations of the ship, crew,
sea, weather and whales.
Melville stresses the risky nature of the work; the tasks required to
hunt a whale and extract its oil are so perilous that one false move at any
point along the way means death to the men involved. Members of the
crew must be prepared to improvise in keeping with shifting conditions.
Ships are out at sea for years at a time, only receiving news and the occa-
sional letter from home through chance meetings with other whaling
ships. The sighting of a whale or another ship is relative to the move-
ments of both the whale or ship and one’s own ship. Days are marked in
terms of whales caught, barrels filled with oil, number of whales sighted,
or the occasional encounter with another ship. The seamen create a
tenuous home on a ship open to the cosmic forces of the sea. As individ-
ual organisms with specific spatial orientations, the disparate space-time
blocks of their bodies have been homogenised into distinct wholes.
Melville presents the members of the crew as colourful personalities,
each with a unique perspective of his own. The social space they share is
created through tactile relations with one another and their environment
The Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space 167
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in rhythms that unfold among them. They locate themselves not with
respect to the town hall or church to which all the members of their town
– whether they know them or not – have an ascertainable spatial rela-
tionship, but rather to the men with whom they work, the tasks they have
to perform, and the whales (always in motion on an ever-changing sea)
they pursue. They orient themselves less in terms of homogeneous space
or chronological time than in terms of the shifting multiplicities of which
they are a part.
Ahab is distinguished from his motley crew less by his eccentricities
than the dangerous direction they have taken. Although at first his obses-
sion with avenging himself against Moby-Dick is compatible with
rhythms established by years of whale hunting, when Ahab relinquishes
the ‘scientific’ use of the quadrant in navigating his space, he is well on
his way to forsaking his men as well as himself for the sake of his obses-
sion. By entering into a becoming-whale, Ahab risks the territorial
refrains of whale hunting and becomes an anomalous member of the
pack of whale hunters (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 244–5); he still
unfolds his actions in keeping with established rhythms of work, but
those rhythms begin to deviate into ever more aberrant patterns. When
Ahab abandons the quadrant, he abandons an already tenuous tie with
the striated space of conventional life to pursue the smooth space of the
nomadic subject to the limit point of the whale hunting multiplicity of
which he is a part.
Ahab’s reaction to the loss of his leg takes the form of a desubjectified
affect – an intensity that has consequences for how one experiences a sit-
uation and thus for one’s actions, but which is itself beyond the reach of
conscious awareness. This ‘irrational’ rupture in his experience of con-
ventional reality intimates the virtual real; his obsessive quest for ven-
geance has tapped into a virtual conjunction that resonates with what
could be as well as what is. This deepening of the feeling of personal
revenge into something larger constitutes a lengthening of the gap
between perception and action that allows Ahab to resonate with the
virtual real. Ahab experiences the space-time between the loss of his leg
and the act that will avenge it as a virtual whole into which all possibil-
ities – both rational and irrational – are telescoped. He attempts not
simply to avenge himself, but to manifest the creative forces with which
he resonates. He remembers his fateful encounter with Moby-Dick not
in terms of the particular longitude and latitude where he lost his leg, but
in terms of a space-time beyond representation. The wind on his face and
the movement of the ship each time he stands on deck, sights a whale, or
orders the lowering of the boats in pursuit of a whale resonate with the
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virtual relations of the fateful encounter as well as the actual effects of
losing a leg.
Ahab’s response to his engagement with Moby-Dick is one that defies
description – he is inspired not by feelings that he can share, but by inten-
sities that resonate with virtual relations not yet actualised. These imper-
ceptible forces push him to do the unthinkable in defiance of the
engrained patterns of years in his profession. He risks everything in order
to find the act that can do justice to the intensities of his experience. As
Ahab dies (thrown into the sea by the harpoon rope caught around his
neck), his ship (having been attacked by Moby-Dick) goes down, killing
everyone on board except Ishmael, the narrator of the book. Thus Ahab’s
line of flight, despite the intensity of its creative force, succeeds only in
destroying his ship, his crew and himself.
When we locate things in terms of a conventional notion of space and
time their identities can be fixed. A subject thinking according to the
classic image of thought posits, ‘the Whole as the final ground of being
or all-encompassing horizon, and the Subject as the principle that con-
verts being into being-for-us’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 379). This
entails a ‘striated mental space’ in which ‘all the varieties of the real and
true find their place’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 379). This subject nav-
igates a regulated space with coordinates that can identify objects. The
nomadic subject who navigates smooth space ‘does things differently’;
she orients herself vis-à-vis a singular race rather than a universal think-
ing subject, and a horizonless milieu rather than an all-encompassing
totality: ‘A tribe in the desert instead of a universal subject within the
horizon of all-encompassing Being’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 379).
Ahab is no longer the universal subject – the sea captain who surveys
his ship and the ocean in terms of a totality within which he has a spe-
cific location. In his becoming-other he becomes many selves all of whom
are connected only by the continuity of a line of becoming. His percep-
tions, affective responses and actions are no longer consolidated in terms
of a self that remains the same over time with a specific location in a tot-
alised space. The singularities selected to actualise – haecceities of move-
ments, affects or intensities that constitute virtual relations in capacities
to affect or be affected, and events of sense – follow aberrant lines and
ametrical rhythms in defiance of conventional space, emotional reac-
tions, or meanings. Ahab does not intend to destroy his ship, his men and
himself. Despite his obsession, he attends to his duties for as long as he
is able. Once Ahab passes a critical threshold, however, he no longer
relates to his situation in terms of a personal self. He is a becoming-
whale. He is a configuration of physical and symbolic forces tapped into
The Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space 169
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a virtual real unfolding forces that were previously only implicit at the
expense of the conventional meanings his life could be given. He thus
orients himself not with respect to patterns of living already enacted in
the past (for example, those of being the captain of a whale hunting ship)
or the homogenised space-times of conventional life, but rather in
keeping with haecceities and events freed from the regulations of norma-
tive expectations.
Becoming-Other and the Virtual Past
Deleuze’s conception of individuality suggests that the self as a kind of
thing with certain attributes is no more than a state of relative equilib-
rium comprising a convergence of multiple lines of force of myriad and
heterogeneous elements that is always about to move into another state.
These lines of force, for language speakers like ourselves, are composed
of symbolic as well as physical elements. Just as a physical body can be
at rest and a person feel a moment of stability as a self, so can a belief or
obsession propel a body into motion. To conceive of the individual in
terms of one of its states of equilibrium is to deny its immersion in a
world of becoming where it both affects and is affected by other forms
of becoming. Normative subjectivity tends to emphasise states of equi-
librium and assimilate its space and time to socially recognisable coordi-
nates. A grid-like conception of space suggests fixed coordinates with
respect to which any and all movement can be mapped. This allows us
to conceive of space as a uniform void inhabited by a shared reality. A
chronological conception of time suggests a temporal grid of instants
that allows the coordination of different temporal perspectives accord-
ing to a set of logically compatible happenings. This allows us to con-
ceive of the world in terms of static entities that can be located within a
homogeneous container of time in the way that static objects can be
located in space conceived as an empty container. Ahab, as a nomadic
subject following a line of flight that changes the nature of the whale
hunting multiplicity, experiences a deterritorialised space and time. It is
the anomolous nature of the space-time block he shares with Moby-Dick
that allows him to free himself from the refrains of life marked out with
others. His example demonstrates just how enticing – and how risky –
entering deterritorialised space-times can be.
Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) notion of the virtual challenges conven-
tional understandings of time. The past as a transcendental field of
virtual relations includes relations that defy chronology; Ahab’s trauma
may have happened in the past, but in his obsessive pursuit of Moby-
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Dick it is as if that past moment and the present are directly linked. For
Deleuze, the past is always present – it insists in the present configura-
tion of forces that inform our situation with virtual forces that may
unfold in more than one way. Like the processes of a body or the speech
patterns of a poem being read aloud, the past is brought into the present
through the force of implicit patterns and relations that are never actu-
alised as well as those that are. This past is not the representable past of
a collective history, but a non-personal past that exceeds any narrative of
a recognisable set of identities. And yet a novel, a painting, a theory can
release some of these virtual possibilities by acting as a vector of force
entering into a field of forces with unprecedented effects.
Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) notion of the virtual likewise challenges
conventional understandings of space. The transcendental field of the
virtual relations of movements include relations that defy the notion of
space as a universal grid within which objects can be located. Just as the
events of sense have virtual relations that may never be actualised in an
embodied thinker, so do spatial haecceities have virtual relations that
insist in the experience of embodied perceivers even if they are impercept-
ible. While the normative subject experiences the perceptible reality of
conventional space and time, the nomadic subject resonates with the
imperceptible relations implicit in her experience. After Ahab’s shift into
obsession, he experienced each movement of his ship and cresting of a
wave as a haecceity resonant with the force of space as a virtual whole;
instead of a void within which he hunted a whale, his space was experi-
enced in terms of haecceities resonant with the unrepresentable force of
the virtual reality that condition any given whale hunt. Symbolic vectors
converge with the forces of bodies, cities, states and the environment in
ways that can consolidate habitual repetitions or set new patterns into
motion. Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) nomadic subject can orient herself
through the establishment of ‘refrains’ that may creatively differ from
established norms (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 310–50). A nomadic
style of subjectivity consists in the unfolding of patterns that are not
referred to an external plan of organisation or conventional notions of
space and time, but rather evolve from the force of patterns immanent to
the individual in its specific milieu.
Ahab’s encounter with Moby-Dick in conjunction with his years in the
smooth space of life on sea led to the actualisation of a line of flight that
unfolded according to a logic increasingly foreign to those around him –
with disastrous results. One lesson one might take from this example is
that it is by living in the shared block of homogenised space-time that we
are able to coordinate a life we can live together. And yet, despite the
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horror of a path of action that destroyed not just Ahab, but his ship
and crew, there is something about Ahab that fascinates us. The virtual
real is always with us, no matter how regulated our lives become.
Unmeasured and unmeasurable spaces beckon us beyond the reassur-
ingly familiar spaces of our shared reality. For Deleuze, mutant spaces
are always right here with us, beckoning us to take risks in our thinking
as well as our living. It is such experiments in living, despite the risks they
entail, that can, if we are careful, help us to evolve creatively with the
becoming-other of life.
The nomadic subject orients herself not through the already estab-
lished norms of socially sanctioned thresholds, but rather through the
events of sense and haecceities of enfleshed memory. As Rosi Braidotti
puts it:
This intensive, zig-zagging, cyclical, and messy type of re-membering does
not even aim at retrieving information in a linear manner. It simply intui-
tively endures . . . It destabilizes identity by opening up spaces where virtual
possibilities can be actualised. It’s a sort of empowerment of all that was not
programmed within the dominant memory. (Braidotti 2002: 399)
Deleuze’s approach entails attending to the imperceptible forces of
meaning, of our bodies, and of the world around us in order to respond
creatively to our situation in a way that is fully resonant with the present
as well as the virtual past insisting in that present. In Difference and
Repetition, Deleuze suggests that chronological time is rooted in the
habitual contractions of organic response and he characterises a kind of
time, the third synthesis of time, that entails superseding automatic
responses in order to draw upon the generative field of the virtual. The
subject able to live this third synthesis of time would change with time
itself rather than mark out her movements with respect to a measurable
chronology. Just as living the temporality of the third synthesis of time
fosters a nomadic subject more interested in creative evolution than pre-
serving a normative self, so does living the spatiality of smooth space
foster creative attunement to aspects of our spatiality that defy regula-
tion.
Where Ahab failed was not in his willingness to open himself to imper-
ceptible forces in defiance of a homogenised space-time lived with others,
but rather in his inability to allow his experiments to resonate with the
experiments of others in a shared flight that took the enfleshed and sym-
bolic memories of a community into account. He experiences his pursuit
of Moby-Dick as something unique, an event stripped of its habitual con-
nections to other whale hunts and instead resonating with unprecedented
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possibilities. Ahab’s revenge is not just any revenge, but a revenge so sin-
gular that his own life, as well as the lives of his men, becomes trivial in
comparison. The haecceity of harpoon hitting whale includes everything
of importance to Ahab; it resonates with all the places and all the
moments when he confronted – or did not confront – his deepest long-
ings and deepest fears. In his obsessive quest for revenge, Ahab entered
a smooth space constituted in relation to Moby-Dick. Ahab’s spatial
orientations were thus, in a sense, reduced from the smooth space created
in relation to his ship and crew as well as the surrounding environment
to those relations of movements concerning his own becoming-whale.
Despite Ahab’s openness to forces beyond the territorial confines of the
established refrains of whale hunting, he is strangely isolated. His obses-
sive focus on Moby-Dick – a whale with which he is in actual contact for
only short periods of time – excludes the force of his daily interactions
with the men and environment of his daily life.
For a more constructive example of a nomadic subject on a line of
flight with an alternative spatial and temporal orientation, we may need
to turn to Virginia Woolf for guidance, who, according to Deleuze and
Guattari:
says that it is necessary to ‘saturate every atom’, and to do that it is neces-
sary to eliminate, to eliminate all that is resemblance and analogy, but also
‘to put everything into it’: eliminate everything that exceeds the moment, but
put in everything that it includes – and the moment is not the instantaneous,
it is the haecceity into which one slips and that slips into other haecceities by
transparency . . . One is then like grass: one has made the world, every-
body/everything, into a becoming, because one has made a necessarily com-
municating world, because one has suppressed in oneself everything that
prevents us from slipping between things and growing in the midst of things
. . . Saturate, eliminate, put everything in. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 280)
Ahab’s experience of space deepened to include not just the path of a
voyage he had done before, but haecceities of whale and sea and ship res-
onant with spaces he had never experienced as well as those he had. Ahab
may have been successful at eliminating resemblance and analogy (the
refrains that might have normalised his behaviour) from his situation,
but he failed to saturate his world with everything it included. Ahab
experienced space in terms of pure relations of movements rather than a
retrospective construct of a socially shared space, but the space-time
block of Ahab and Moby-Dick excluded the improvised rhythms of
Ahab’s men. Thus the refrains connecting Ahab to humanity mutated
and his becoming-other became a path of destruction rather than a crea-
tive evolution that could disseminate throughout the social field.
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Any spatial orientation entails the territorialisation of distinct milieus
into one whole, and thus the actualisation of specific singularities at the
expense of others. As creatures of becoming we must improvise the
rhythms that keep us connected with life without completely deterritori-
alising from the refrains that sustain our homes. The striations of a tot-
alised space provide a collective refrain that may either drown out or help
harmonise our improvisations. But the striated space of conventional
spatial orientations is not the only alternative. The refrains we evolve in
the improvisations of daily interactions could unfold a smooth space
through ‘an infinite succession of linkages and changes in direction’ that
create shifting mosaics of space-times out of the heterogeneous blocks of
different milieus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 494). To saturate the
moment, we must be willing to relinquish our attempts to embody the
power of life as individuals and mutate our lines of flight in keeping with
the improvisations of those around us. Attuning ourselves to life-as-
becoming requires disorienting ourselves from established spatial norms
in order to attend to spaces unfolded in the play of movement. But if we
are not to destroy ourselves in the process, it also requires that our
smooth spaces be created from the ametrical space-times of an open-
ended humanity that we can unfold together.
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Notes
1. Deleuze develops the notion of the virtual throughout his work. For example,
see Deleuze 1991: 42–3, 82–3; Deleuze 1994: 207–14; Deleuze and Guattari
1994: 156–7; and Deleuze 2001: 25–33. For some recent helpful commentary,
see Colebrook 2002: 97 and Massumi 2002 generally.
2. Among the forces affecting human existence is the force of sense. Deleuze (and
Guattari) think of the sense of language as a virtual field that is actualised in the
concrete words of embodied individuals. Concepts are events of philosophical
thinking that ‘hover’ over concrete states of affairs; their sense can never be
exhausted in a specific use of a term, but unfolds in concrete meanings actual-
ised in shifting contexts. Specific meanings come into play when I think, speak,
or write, but there are always other meanings virtually implicit in language that
could be actualised.
3. To put it in Melville’s words:
[E]ver since that almost fatal encounter, Ahab had cherished a wild vindictive-
ness against the whale, all the more fell for that in his frantic morbidness he
at last came to identify with him, not only all his bodily woes, but all his intel-
lectual and spiritual exasperations. The White Whale swam before him as the
monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some deep men
feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart and half a
lung . . . [W]hen by this collision forced to turn towards home, and for long
months of days and weeks, Ahab and anguish lay stretched together in one
hammock, rounding in mid winter that dreary, howling Patagonian Cape;
then it was, that his torn body and gashed soul bled into one another; and so
interfusing, made him mad. (Melville 1967: 175)
4. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze distinguishes events of sense from specific prop-
ositions and states of affairs. An event of sense – ‘to hunt whales’ – can be applied
to any number of whale-hunting situations. Events are pure becomings that
Deleuze aligns with an alternative conception of time – the time of Aion, ‘the
time of the pure event or of becoming, which articulates relative speeds and
slownesses independently of the chronometric or chronological values that time
assumes in the other modes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 263). In the time of
Aion events are connected in the incompossible whole of duration or the virtual
real.
5. For a helpful description of the Bergsonian notion of space as a retrospective
construct, see Massumi 2002: 6.
6. Deleuze 1986: 110, quoting Béla Balàzs.
7. See Brian Massumi’s excellent and intriguing account of affects in ‘The
Autonomy of Affect’ (2002: 23–45).
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